

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----
AGENCY INFORMATION

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TO :
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NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION
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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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7 August 1962

OSD(PA) DFOISR
TOP SECRET CONTROL
Copy No. Original (P2)
Case No. 91-FOI-6376
T.S. No. 91-TS-39
Document No. 26

MILITARY

General Benjamin T. Harris, DOD/JCS Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:

1. Support: Within its capabilities DOD is prepared to provide all required support to CIA, State and USIA necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives of Operation Mongoose.

2. Military Readiness: If there is a decision to use U.S. military force, execution of our military contingency plans for Cuba will be undertaken as rapidly as the posture of our forces will allow at the time the decision is made.

a. With no prior warning and with 18 days of preparation a coordinated airborne/amphibious assault could be executed which, it is anticipated, would gain control of key military installations and the principal centers of population of Cuba within 10 days and result in minimum US and Cuban casualties. This plan provides for confronting Cuban forces with sufficient strength to be clearly beyond Cuban capability to resist, to induce early capitulation of their units and to avoid needless loss of life.

b. A requirement to reduce significantly the pre-assault period would necessitate incremental commitment of US forces as they could be assembled and employed. Under this plan the time required to gain essential US military control of Cuba could be appreciably extended. However, reduction of US military reaction time may be of overriding importance. In such case, air and naval forces could attack with little delay from the time the decision is made. An air assault could be initiated within 8 hours; an airborne assault could be initiated within 5 days; and a Navy/ Marine amphibious force could be committed 3 days later with a build up of the full scale effort to follow.

c. In concept, initial military operations commence with an air and naval blockade, concentrated air strikes, and coordinated naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy airpower and to neutralize and destroy as much as possible of the enemy armor, artillery and air capability.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
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Jm 6/23/98

OSD, NO OBJECTION
25 JUN 98

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(DOC 13)
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7 August 1962

OASD(PA) DFOISR	
TOP SECRET CONTROL	
Copy No.	12
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b. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Under this plan the time required to gain essential US military control of Cuba could be appreciably extended. However, reduction of US military reaction time may be of overriding importance. In such case, air and naval forces could attack with little delay from the time the decision is made. An air assault could be initiated [REDACTED] an airborne assault could be initiated [REDACTED] and a Navy/ Marine amphibious force could be committed [REDACTED] with a build up of the full scale effort to follow [REDACTED]

c. In concept, initial military operations commence with an air and naval blockade, concentrated air strikes, and coordinated naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy airpower and to neutralize and destroy as much as possible of the enemy armor, artillery and anti-air capability.

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